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 1 INTRODUCTION  
Cause-consequence diagrams (Nielsen 1975) were 
developed as a graphical tool for the analysis and 
description of relevant accidents in a complex nu-
clear power plant and have subsequently been used 
in many industrial systems. The diagrams consist 
mainly of decision boxes which contain compo-
nent/subsystem conditions. Following the YES/NO 
branches of the decision boxes the CCD is devel-
oped until the branches terminate in consequence 
boxes. They are attractive to engineers as the dia-
gram can be constructed directly from the system 
description and it contains a full textual description 
of the systems behaviour. The exact system reliabil-
ity can be obtained from the diagram in a very effi-
cient calculation procedure. However, for many 
situations the diagram obtained will be very large 
and its final form is dependent upon the analyst con-
structing it. A faster and error free analysis could be 
performed if the CCD could be automatically gener-
ated by computer from the system description (Niel-
sen & Runge 1974). 
Techniques have been developed previously 
which automate the construction and analysis of 
fault trees, see Lapps & Powers (1977), Salem et al. 
(1976), Xie et al. (1993), Henry & Andrews (1997), 
etc. These techniques have been extended in the 
work presented here to automate the construction of 
the CCD. 
2 AUTOMATED CCD CONSTRUCTION & 
ANALYSIS ALGORITHM 
The aim of the algorithm described in this work is to 
automatically construct a complete CCD for any in-
dustrial system which accurately models the physi-
cal behaviour of the system itself. The automatic 
generation is based on the following steps: 
2.1 Requirements 
In order to generate a CCD, three basic types of in-
formation are required: the component models, sys-
tem topology diagram and the failure rate data. The 
component models are in the form of decision tables 
(Salem et al. 1976), which give a description of how 
the input and internal operational modes of each 
component influence the output states of that com-
ponent. The system topology diagram describes how 
the various components of the system are intercon-
nected. The failure rate data includes a description of 
the failure rates and failure modes of the compo-
nents, and is used in the final CCD quantification. 
For some systems, initial states for the components 
are also specified. 
In order to begin the construction process an ini-
tiating event should be identified and given by the 
user. It is generally changes to the state of a compo-
nent which initiates the system. In the algorithm pre-
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 sented here that is represented by a component with 
an associated function. In order to ensure that the 
CCD construction process completes and that the al-
gorithm reaches a consequence, stopping criteria 
must also be identified. 
2.2 Construction algorithm 
The CCD is constructed by applying a set of rules 
which have been developed in the course of this 
study. These rules have not been listed here in order 
to present the work in a concise manner, however 
some of them are included and applied in the exam-
ple in section 3.3. In summary, initially the order in 
which components are considered is determined by 
use of the topology diagram. If the system contains 
circuits, these are considered first. A circuit is a path 
starting and ending at the same component which 
contains a power supply, and with all components 
passing current. Once the order is determined the 
CCD is constructed starting with the initiating event. 
The functionality of each component or subsystem, 
taken in the order determined, is then investigated 
using the decision tables and topology diagram. The 
procedure continues until the stopping criteria is 
reached, i.e. the consequences of investigated se-
quences determined. 
2.3 Reduction 
The algorithm then reduces the CCD to its minimal 
form. Each decision box in CCD is inspected and if 
any is deemed irrelevant (e.g. the branches attached 
to the NO and YES branches are identical) then this 
box is removed and the next decision box or conse-
quence box in the path put in its place. When no fur-
ther redundancies exist the cause-consequence dia-
gram is deemed minimal (Andrews & Ridley 2001). 
2.4 Development of fault trees and analysis 
If a decision box in the CCD is governed not by a 
component but by a sub-system then the failure 
probability will be obtained via a fault tree (An-
drews & Ridley 2002). The fault trees are produced 
automatically using fault tree construction methods 
developed previously (Salem et al. 1976, Henry & 
Andrews 1997). 
Having constructed the CCD it can be used to 
analyse the system. A qualitative analysis produces 
the list of causes for each outcome. These are estab-
lished by considering each decision box on a path to 
the particular outcome condition and listing the 
states of the components as indicated by the exit 
path from the decision box. 
A quantitative analysis produces each system 
outcome probability. These are obtained by simply 
multiplying the probabilities of the component 
events in the branch leading to that consequence, 
since the algorithm ensures that the probabilities of 
the decision boxes of the CCD are independent 
(Nielsen 1975). 
3 APPLICATION – FLUE DAMPER SYSTEM 
To demonstrate the proposed algorithm it is applied 
to a flue damper system. 
3.1 System description 
Gas-fired storage water heaters are equipped with a 
device hood that regulates the flow or circulation of 
air connecting the flue to the chimney. Electric flue 
dampers open before the burner starts to allow com-
bustion products to vent up the flue and close when 
the water is up to temperature to stop heat escaping. 
In this example, the operation “to fire burner” is 
considered. As shown in Figure 1, the flue damper 
electrical system consists of a relay and its contacts, 
the damper motor, a thermostat, an end switch, the 
burner control unit and the power supply. The initial 
states of the components are: damper closed, relay 
contacts close, thermostat open, end switch open. 
The system then operates by closing the thermostat 
due to the low temperature being reached. The relay 
is then energised and its contacts open stopping the 
motor. The spring drives the damper blade open 
which closes the end switch. Since the current 
reaches the burner control unit the burner fires. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The flue damper electrical system. 
 
Following the automated CCD construction algo-
rithm outlined above the following steps are taken. 
3.2 Algorithm inputs 
A topology diagram for the flue damper system is 
constructed as shown in Figure 2. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A topology diagram for the flue damper system. 
 
 
Where TH is the thermostat, RE is the relay, PS is 
the power supply, M is the motor, SP is the spring, 
DB is the damper blade, ES is the switch, BCU is 
the burner control unit, CN are the relay contacts 
and J1-J5 are junctions 1-5 respectively. In Figure 2 
OUT1 of RE connects to IN2 of CN. 
There are eleven decision tables relevant to the 
components in the example, see Tables 1-11 below. 
As an example of how to construct a decision table 
for a component, consider the thermostat, see Table 
1, which closes or opens according to the tempera-
ture. Two failure modes have been considered here, 
failed open (FO), when the component fails so that 
no connection is made, and failed closed (FC), when 
it cannot open. The number of failure modes consid-
ered is determined by the analyst. From the topology 
diagram, Figure 2, it is seen that TH has two inputs, 
IN1, – the automatic closing or opening according to 
the temperature and, IN2, the current from PS. IN1 
has two possible states, closed (CL) and open (OP), 
and IN2 has current (C) or no current (NC). Table 1 
considers all possible combinations of inputs from 
IN1 and IN2 and all possible states of TH and the ef-
fects these will have on the output to the relay or end 
switch. The sign “–” in the inputs and state columns 
indicates the “don’t matter” condition meaning that 
the specified input states will result in the specified 
output state regardless of the value of the variable. 
Considering the two causes of current in the output, 
from Table 1 it can be seen that 2 rows give this re-
sult: 
row 1: input 1 is closed (IN1 = CL), current in input 
2 (IN2 = C) and thermostat working (W); 
row 5: current in input 2 (IN2 = C) and the thermo-
stat failed closed (FC). 
The decision table for the thermostat has two 
functions, which change the input IN1 when the if 
condition is satisfied, these are listed below the ta-
ble. These two functions state that: 
1. If the thermostat is working and the tempera-
ture is high (HT) then the component opens 
(IN1 => OP); 
2. If the thermostat is working and the tempera-
ture is low (LT) then the thermostat closes 
(IN1 => CL). 
The decision tables for the other components 
have been constructed by using the same technique. 
 
Table 1. Decision table for the thermostat. 
 IN1 IN2 State OUT 
1 CL C W C 
2 OP – W NC 
3 – NC – NC 
4 – – FO NC 
5 – C FC C 
(1) TH: If (State = W ∩  Temp = HT),  
then IN1 => OP; 
(2) TH: If (State = W ∩  Temp = LT), 
then IN1 => CL. 
 
Table 2. Decision table for the end switch. 
 IN1 IN2 State OUT 
1 CL C W C 
2 OP – W NC 
3 – NC – NC 
4 – – FO NC 
5 – C FC C 
 
Table 3. Decision table for the burner control unit. 
 IN State OUT1 OUT2 
1 C W ON C 
2 C F OFF C 
3 NC – OFF NC 
 
Table 4. Decision table for the power  
supply. 
 IN State OUT 
1 C W C 
2 – F NC 
3 NC – NC 
 
Table 5. Decision table for the junctions 1-4. 
 IN1 IN2 OUT1 OUT2 
1 C – C  
2 – C C  
3 NC NC NC  
4 C  C C 
5 NC  NC NC 
 
Table 6. Decision table for the relay. 
 IN State OUT1 OUT2 
1 C W OP C 
2 NC W CL NC 
3 – FO OP – 
4 – FC CL – 
5 C – – C 
6 NC – – NC 
 
 Table 7. Decision table for the  
contacts. 
 IN1 IN2 OUT 
1 C CL C 
2 – OP NC 
3 NC – NC 
 
Table 8. Decision table for the motor. 
 IN State OUT1 OUT2 
1 C W ON C 
2 C F OFF C 
3 NC – OFF NC 
 
Table 9. Decision table for the  
junction 5. 
 IN OUT1 OUT2 
1 ON ON ON 
2 OFF OFF OFF 
 
Table 10. Decision table for the spring. 
 IN State OUT 
1 OFF W OP 
2 OFF F CL 
3 ON – CL 
 
Table 11. Decision table for the damper blade. 
 IN1 IN2 OUT1 OUT2 
1 ON – CL OP 
2 – OP OP CL 
3 OFF CL CL OP 
 
Where ON and OFF denotes motor turned on and 
off respectively, and F is failed. The blank cells in 
the decision table for the junctions 1-4 are irrelevant. 
The failure data for the components in the flue 
damper system is shown in Table 12. Failure rates 
have not been included as the example has been 
taken in order to demonstrate the construction proc-
ess. 
 
Table 12. Failure data for the components. 
Compo-
nent 
Failure  
mode 
Description 
TH_FO Thermostat failed opened, it doesn’t 
close when temperature is low 
TH 
 
TH_FC Thermostat failed closed, it doesn’t 
open when temperature is high 
ES_FO End switch failed opened, damper  
blade cannot close it 
ES 
 
ES_FC End switch failed closed, it cannot 
be opened 
BCU 
 
BCU_F Burner control unit failed, it 
doesn’t fire 
PS 
 
PS_F Power supply failed, no current to 
the circuits 
RE_FO Relay contacts fails opened RE 
 RE_FC Relay contacts fails closed 
M M_F Motor failed, damper blade  
cannot be closed 
SP 
 
SP_F Spring failed, damper blade  
cannot be opened 
The initial conditions, are that the thermostat and 
the end switch are open, and the relay contacts and 
the damper blade are closed, i.e.: 
TH: IN1 = OP; 
ES: IN1 = OP; 
RE: OUT1 = CL; 
DB: OUT1 = CL. 
The initiating component and its function must 
now be identified. The system considered is initiated 
when the thermostat closes. Therefore the initiating 
event is taken to be the thermostat TH with the tem-
perature assumed to be low, i.e.: 
TH: Temp = LT. 
The stopping criteria for the operation “to fire 
burner” is that all the components in  the system 
which have the capability to change their outputs 
have been considered. Hence every path of the dia-
gram terminates in one of the following conse-
quences: 
• normal start, i.e. system works normally; 
• failed to start, i.e. damper blade opens, but 
burner doesn’t fire; 
• no start, i.e. damper blade remains closed 
and burner doesn’t fire. 
Thus the consequence box will be governed by 
the output of the damper blade and the burner con-
trol unit. If neither of these components are consid-
ered while constructing any of the CCD branches, 
the consequence box will show their initial outputs. 
The algorithm now has all the information it re-
quires to generate the CCD. 
3.3 Construction of CCD 
As mentioned in section 2.2 the CCD is constructed 
by applying a set of rules. Some of these rules rele-
vant to the example are listed below to demonstrate 
the procedure:  
1. Initially the algorithm decides the order in 
which the components are to be considered. 
Starting from the initiating event, compo-
nents are traced through the topology dia-
gram and if any circuits are identified these 
are numbered. If a component is within a cir-
cuit and its output is connected to another 
component which is contained within a dif-
ferent circuit, then, these two circuits must be 
considered in turn when constructing the 
CCD. 
2. If the considered component and its function 
are traced in a circuit the decision box is cre-
ated asking about current or no current in the 
circuit according to expected condition of 
considered component, else the decision box 
added to the CCD is related to the output of 
the component obtained from the compo-
nents decision table. 
 3. The output of the component which is con-
sidered is obtained by taking the rows in the 
decision table in turn with the “don’t matter” 
cells ignored and considered last with such 
cells in inputs or state of the component. 
4. If  a circuit contains any components with 
external output then these should be consid-
ered first. 
5. When the output of a component is set, from 
the topology diagram the component con-
nected to this output is traced and hence an 
input in the decision table for this component 
set. Then all remaining inputs and the state of 
this following component are considered in 
the order in which the columns and then the 
rows follow in the table. 
6. If there are “don’t matter” cells in the inputs 
or state of the row of the decision table con-
sidered, these should be checked for consis-
tency with assumptions made so far. 
7. If the given inputs for the component consid-
ered in a row of the decision table result in 
outputs which match previous ones then con-
sider the next row of the table. If there are no 
more rows consider the component con-
nected to the considered components output. 
8. If a component is repeated in the same 
branch of the CCD with the same inputs and 
outputs, then a consequence box is created.  
9. When the stopping criteria is reached – cre-
ate a consequence box indicating the result. 
10. The CCD is constructed by completing the 
YES branches of the decision boxes first un-
til a consequence box is reached and then 
back tracking to the last decision box and 
developing the NO branch in the same way. 
In the example applying rule 1 it can be seen that 
there are three circuits: {PS, J1, CN, M, J2, PS}, 
{PS, J1, TH, J3, ES, BCU, J4, J2, PS} and {PS, J1, 
TH, J3, RE, J4, J2, PS}. As the circuits contain dif-
ferent components they are treated individually. 
Since the thermostat TH is the initiating compo-
nent and the input is Temp = LT, the conditions for 
the second function of the thermostat are satisfied 
only if TH is in a working state, see Table 1.  
Assuming that TH is working so that IN1 => CL, 
the algorithm searches for the circuits which contain 
this component, these are: 2nd {PS, J1, TH, J3, ES, 
BCU, J4, J2, PS} and 3rd {PS, J1, TH, J3, RE, J4, 
J2, PS}. Hence these are investigated in turn starting 
with the 2nd circuit. The algorithm searches for the 
rows in Table 1 whose first column for the input IN1 
could take the value CL. These are rows 1, 3, 4 and 
5. Considering row 1, IN2 = C. The algorithm then 
traces the other components in circuit 2. TH is con-
nected to ES and for this component the initial con-
ditions state that IN1 = OP. Hence only rows 2-4 in 
Table 2 are satisfied. These all result in OUT = NC 
and hence there is no current in the 2nd circuit. No 
decision box relating to circuit 2 is therefore neces-
sary. The topology diagram (Fig. 2) is then checked 
to determine if any components within circuit 2 have 
outputs that are external and therefore connect to 
components within other circuits or parts of the sys-
tem, see rule 4. Only one component is identified, 
the burner control unit with external output OUT1. 
As IN of BCU is NC row 3 is satisfied resulting in 
OUT1 = OFF, see Table 3. 
Circuit 3 is investigated next and rule 2 applied. 
As row 1 in Table 1 for TH is being considered, de-
cision box 1 is created related to the output OUT = 
C, see Figure 3a: “Is C in Circuit 3?” i.e. does the 
thermostat close and power supply work? 
The YES branches of the decision boxes are 
traced first until the consequence box is reached, ac-
cording to the rule 10 developed. Therefore the YES 
branch of decision box 1 is traced which results in 
current in the 3rd circuit, hence there is current C in 
OUT of PS (row 1 in Table 4), OUT2 of J1 (row 4 in 
Table 5), OUT of TH (row 1 in Table 1), OUT2 of 
J3 (row 4 in Table 5), OUT2 of RE (rows 1, 3-5 in 
Table 6), OUT1 of J4 (row 2 in Table 5) and OUT1 
of J2 (row 2 in Table 5). Any components within the 
3rd circuit with external output are then considered 
(rule 4). There is only one, RE, with external output 
OUT1. Since C is in IN, four matches are found 
(rows 1, 3, 4 and 5, Table 6). However, in the 3rd 
row the relay is in a failed opened state, which con-
tradicts the initial assumption that the relay is closed. 
Also conditions in row 5 do not affect OUT1 and 
hence are not considered at this point as stated in 
rule 3. Considering the remaining rows in turn row 1 
is considered first and in this case OUT1 = OP, 
hence the decision box contains the question “Is RE: 
OUT1 = OP?” (rule 2). 
According to rule 5, the algorithm proceeds by 
tracing the component connected to the external out-
put of relay. From the topology diagram, Figure 2, it 
can be seen that output OUT1 of RE connects to in-
put IN3 of contacts CN, which is within circuit 1: 
{PS, J1, CN, M, J2, PS}. By the conditions already 
considered, i.e. the power supply being in a working 
state and the relay contacts being opened (row 2 in 
Table 7), following the YES branch of decision box 
2, circuit 1 doesn’t pass current. The external output 
OUT1 of motor M is considered next (rule 4), but no 
decision box is created since there is only one possi-
ble outcome in this case (rule 7), see row 3 in Table 
8. 
Since all possible circuits and components with 
external outputs have been investigated, the func-
tions of TH can now be checked, but none of them 
are implemented as the temperature has not changed. 
Following the YES branch of decision box 2, the 
algorithm proceeds by considering the output of the 
spring, as OUT1 of M is connected to IN of SP via 
 junction J5 (row 2 in Table 9). Two rows, 1 and 2, of 
the decision table for the spring (Table 10) are appli-
cable as IN = OFF. Considering row 1 decision box 
3 is created “Is SP: OUT = OP?” (rule 2), see Figure 
3b. By examining the system topology diagram (Fig. 
2) it can be seen that OUT1 of M and OUT of SP are 
connected to the inputs, IN1 and IN2, of DB, respec-
tively. Following the YES branch of box 3 results in 
the 2nd row of the decision table for the damper 
blade being the appropriate row, see Table 11. 
As OUT2 of damper blade is connected to IN1 of 
end switch the component ES is considered next, 
which is within circuit 2. Four rows (rows 1, 3-5) of 
the decision table for ES (Table 2) are applicable as 
IN1 = CL. Since the initial condition for the end 
switch was IN1 = OP the component cannot have 
failed closed and hence the 5th row is not possible 
(rule 6). Considering row 1 in Table 2 decision box 
4: “Is C in Circuit 2?” is created (rule 2), see Figure 
3b. Following the YES branch component BCU is 
considered next as according to rule 4 it has external 
output OUT1.  Rows 1 and 2 in Table 3 satisfy the 
criteria, and row 1 is considered first. Hence the de-
cision box 5 is created with the question related to 
the output OUT1 in row 1: “Is BCU: OUT1 = ON?” 
(rule 2), see Figure 3b. 
The stopping criteria is now reached as all the 
necessary components in the system have been 
checked. Hence, following rule 9, the YES branch of 
the CCD terminates in a consequence box indicating 
a normal start as damper blade is open (DB: OUT1 
= OP) and burner control unit is on (BCU: OUT1 = 
ON), see Figure 3b. 
The algorithm proceeds by returning to the NO 
outputs of the last decision box (rule 10), which in 
this case is box 5. Following the NO branch all pos-
sible values of OUT1 in Table 3, except for ON, 
must be considered with IN = C from box 4. There is 
only one other value, OFF, and only row 2 coincides 
with the given situation. As there are no other op-
tions for the components considered the stopping 
criteria is reached and according to rule 9 a conse-
quence box “failed to start” is created (i.e. DB: 
OUT1 = OP, BCU: OUT1 = OFF), see Figure 3b. 
The rest of the diagram is obtained in the same 
manner by back tracking to the last decision box and 
developing the NO branch until the diagram is com-
plete (rule 10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3a. Cause-consequence diagram for the flue damper 
system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3b. Cause-consequence diagram for the flue damper 
system. 
3.4 Reduction of CCD 
The cause-consequence diagram presented in Fig-
ures 3a, b cannot be reduced as no redundant deci-
sion boxes are identified. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Fault trees for the CCD shown in Figures 3a, b. 
3.5 Development of fault trees 
Fault trees are now developed according to the deci-
sion table method for each decision box starting with 
the first one and these are shown in Figure 4. 
3.6 Qualitative and quantitative analysis 
Having obtained the diagram it can now be analysed 
and quantified in a straightforward manner. 
For the flue damper system considered the failure 
event is “failed to start”, i.e. the consequence DB: 
OUT1 = OP, BCU: OUT1 = OFF. There are four 
consequence boxes with this outcome in the dia-
gram. The failure events leading to these boxes must 
be traced to obtain the minimal cut sets, e.g. for the 
consequence box on the NO branch of decision box 
5 the component failures leading to this are given 
from Ft5 (fault tree 5), i.e. BCU_F. Considering the 
other consequence boxes in the same manner leads 
to the complete list of minimal cut sets: {BCU_F}, 
{ES_FO}, while {RE_FC, M_F, BCU_F} and 
{RE_FC, M_F, ES_FO} are non minimal. The prob-
ability of the outcome “failed to start” can be ob-
tained by adding the probability of each path: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where qTH_FO is the probability of thermostat (TH) 
failure to close (fails open); qPS_F is the probability 
of power supply (PS) failure; qRE_FC is the probabil-
ity of relay (RE) failure to open the contacts (fails 
closed); qSP_FC is the probability of spring (SP) fail-
ure to open the damper blade; qES_FO is the probabil-
ity of end switch (ES) failure to close; qBCU_F is the 
probability of burner control unit (BCU) failure and 
qM_F is the probability of motor (M) failure. 
Although this is only a small example it has fea-
tures typical of a larger industrial system. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
An automated cause-consequence diagram construc-
tion algorithm has been proposed in this paper. Em-
ploying the system topology diagram and decision 
tables as well as methods developed previously for 
fault tree construction the algorithm develops the 
CCD in an efficient manner. There is a set of auto-
matic CCD construction rules given here, but for 
reading conciseness they have not been included in 
the text. Once the diagram is obtained the probabili-
ties of all the possible outcomes can be easily quan-
tified. 
In this paper the algorithm is applied to a simple 
example in order to demonstrate the feasibility of the 
approach. It has also been applied to several substan-
tial industrial examples and found to perform well. 
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